THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL

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FOX NEWS / AP, FEBRUARY 26, 2004

Milosevic Likely to be Acquitted on Genocide Charges

Many Serbs would cheer it as vindicating their view that Serbia stands wrongly accused. Others likely will see it as a distortion of Europe's darkest chapter since World War II. And it may provide important lessons for those planning a trial for Saddam Hussein [more]

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ICTY - Milosevic Trial - The Hague - Court Room One - Day 178-79, 29 April, 2003

THE HAGUE -- A former casino manager gave the Trial Chamber a glimpse of Serbia's underworld and its connections to government officials in testimony this week at the war crimes trial of Slobodan Milosevic. Following Serbia's recent massive crackdown on organized crime, this should come as no surprise to the public. Recent arrests and confessions have revealed a web of interconnections among organized crime, common criminals, politicians, government and party officials and war criminals. Throughout Milosevic's rule and for two years thereafter, Serbia was a criminal state -- with a thin veneer of legitimacy meant to fool the international community and at least some of the Serbs. Recent revelations in Serbia add support to Witness C-48's testimony.

C-48 was a young man who became attracted by the power, money and lifestyle of gangland Serbia. After landing a position at a Novi Sad casino, he was quickly promoted to manager and almost as quickly recruited by the Serbian State Security Service (DB). Not only did he become privy to tales of DB ordered liquidations and heroin trafficking, he betrayed his closest friends. In court, C-48 expressed "shame" at his actions that led to an assault on one friend's elderly mother.

His boss at the casino, Veselin Vukotic, was a professional killer who confided in his young employee that he had carried out political liquidations in the Albanian emigree communities abroad at the behest of the Yugoslav Security Service and later the Serbian DB. One Kosovar Albanian exile he personally killed for the Serbian DB was Enver Hadriu, a human rights activist. The government strategy at that time for dealing with the Kosovar Albanians, Vukotic told him, was to liquidate the intelligentsia. Later, under Milosevic, it changed to one of broad societal oppression, which Vukotic thought far less effective since it elicited international condemnation.

In a rather startling revelation, C-48 testified that another known criminal and DB operative, Darko Asanin, told C-48 that he was given the task of organizing the transfer of large quantities of heroin to Croatia to be used as a special form of warfare to addict and thereby destroy the fighting morale of Croatian youth. "I was horrified and flabbergasted," C-48 told the Trial Chamber. "These monstrous activities bordered on Nazi type activities." The DB's involvement in heroin trafficking, if true, is more than ironic given that Serbian propaganda has stereotyped Kosovar Albanians as THE quintessential drug traffickers of the Balkans.

Asenin also told C-48 that he organized a group of young men, led by Pero Divljak, to cause unrest in Montenegro before the presidential elections there in 1997. In that election, Milo Djukanovic, who'd broken with Milosevic, was running against Momir Bulatovic, a Milosevic loyalist. Divljak and his group were discovered before they could carry out their mission -- and Djukanovic was elected.

From the Novi Sad DB chief, C-48 learned that the Red Berets were formed at the end of 1991, when the DB decided it needed a disciplined unit under its control. Other Serbian paramilitary units fighting in Croatia, such as Seselj's Chetniks, the White Eagles and Dusan Silni, were undisciplined and acting outside any organized chain of command.

The casino complex where C-48 worked served as a meeting place and playground for a cross section of Serbian criminals and politicians. Vukotic provided drugs and prostitutes for DB members who came for "relaxation." When asked by prosecutor Geoffrey Nice whether Milosevic knew officials in the DB frequented the casino and associated with criminals, C-48 said, "As I knew all the circumstances, I am quite certain the accused knew his people came to the Royal and associated with criminals. I can't claim he knew the details." He testified to seeing photos of Vukotic with Milosevic's son and daughter.

Referring to the witness's written statement, Milosevic later followed up by asking C-48 if it was true that the DB used the casino "to gain control over certain people by letting them gamble, and supplying them with prostitutes." When C-48 said yes, Milosevic asked for the name of such an individual. The witness promptly replied, "Miodrag "Mile" Isakov, the [current] Deputy Prime Minister of the Serbian Government." At the time, he said, he was president of the Independent Journalists Association. According to C-48, Isakov gambled and lost financial assistance awarded to the Association from the Soros Foundation. This is one time the Serbian public and officials are likely to take notice of testimony in the long-running trial of Slobodan Milosevic.

Vukotic also hosted more serious meetings of a group called the Backa Palanka Lobby, made up of individuals from the Serbian police, DB, information and propaganda department of the political apparatus and criminals. Among those C-48 identified as members were Mihajl Kertes (senior government official), Jovica Stanisic (head of the Serbian DB), Franko Simatovic (head of the Serbian DB special operations unit), Milorad Vucelic (Director of Radio Television Serbia (RTS)), Radovan Pankov (regional party official), the Popivoda brothers (one -- head of Novi Sad DB, other -- marketing director of RTS) and Veselin Asanin (DB operative and convicted criminal). The purpose of the Lobby, according to the witness, was to implement the decisions of the accused by harmonizing and coordinating activity among the various elements involved.

C-48 described several meetings of the Lobby where he was present. As a trusted DB operative, he was allowed there to assure the participants' needs (for coffee, drinks, etc.) were attended to. At a meeting in August 1992, for example, Jovica Stanisic began by relating to those assembled that the "boss" (Milosevic) wanted to assure that his policy of creating a fait accompli in Croatia for the London Conference was implemented. That policy involved intimidating Croatians to move from designated territories in Croatia, creating Serb-populated areas that Serbia could then claim as its territory in a fait accompli at the upcoming London Conference. Stanisic said the "boss" wanted them to proceed in a subtle manner, intimidating a few to instill fear in many.

The group also discussed Milan Panic, then President of the Federal presidency. Milosevic had wanted him in that position so he could work on getting sanctions against Serbia removed, but he was proving uncontrollable. Stanisic then inquired of Mihajl Kertes whether he was keeping Goran Hadzic, president of the Republic of Serbia Krajina (RSK), under control. When Kertes said he shouldn't worry, Stanisic reportedly replied, "Good, good. We don't want him to think he's really the president."

The following month, the Lobby met again. The participants joked about Panic having dismissed Kertes at the London Conference due to ethnic cleansing that occurred in Croatia. Stanisic then conveyed a message to Franko Simatovic (Frenki) from the "boss" that he should step up actions in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem (SBWS). He also warned him to calm down his guys, whose bragging threatened to disclose DB involvement in SBWS. Frenki replied they were young and "without them we wouldn't be able to achieve anything."

The third meeting C-48 testified about was the most controversial as Milosevic allegedly attended it. The time was March 1993. Milosevic, in Novi Sad for a regional meeting of his political party, came to the Lobby meeting afterward, escorted by Jovica Stanisic. According to the witness, Milosevic expressed pleasure at the way things were going in SBWS, and said he was "looking forward to seeing how the Croatians will ask for the Krajina from me when just Serbs are living there... ." He then said "all kinds of pressure should be maintained to create a united Serbian state," consisting of the RS, RSK, Serbia and Montenegro.

Knowledgeable observers expressed disbelief that Milosevic would reveal so much in a meeting of ten associates, regardless of how close they might be to him. In cross examination, Milosevic declared he was not in Novi Sad at the time and the witness had fabricated this testimony. If it is true, it is the some of the closest evidence of a "smoking gun" yet to appear in the trial -- at least in public sessions. Of course, it is up to the Trial Chamber to consider the witness's credibility and weigh his evidence.

The witness was privy to other conversations involving high level DB authorities (including Stanisic, Simatovic and Kertes) as they discussed how to control local Serbian authorities in Croatia and Bosnia. One conversation corroborated testimony from Milan Babic that he was replaced by Goran Hadzic, when Babic disagreed with directions coming from Serbia. In another, Simatovic compared Radovan Karadzic unfavorably with Hadzic: "We gave him [Karadzic] everything and now he doesn't want to listen to us," the witness quoted. The witness also described how the commander of paramilitary units in Erdut saluted and reported to Simatovic when he arrived at the camp.

Whether the Trial Chamber finds credible C-48's testimony about the Milosevic meeting of the Backa Palanka Lobby, the witness's detailed account of the DB use of criminals and criminal methods to ethnically cleanse parts of Croatia is hard to dismiss as fabricated. Indeed, C-48's testimony is corroborated by significant other evidence presented in the trial to date, not least of which was given recently by Arkan's secretary. C-48 has added to the evidence that the Serbian State Security controlled and manipulated events in the Serbian Krajina in Croatia. That directly contradicts Milosevic's defense that Serbia, and he as its President, was not involved in what he claims were civil wars in Croatia and Bosnia. Even if C-48's testimony is exaggerated, he's left Milosevic much to answer.

/Submitted by Judith Armatta on 29 April, 2003/

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ICTY - Milosevic Trial - The Hague - Court Room One - Day 139, 30 JANUARY 2003

Serbia Supplied Weapons to Croatian Serbs

Three comments by Judy Armatta from the Coalition for International Justice www.cij.org

1) Serbia Supplied Weapons to Croatian Serbs

2) Early Warnings of Ethnic Cleansing

3) Being Neutral In a Non-Neutral Situation: The UN Problem in Bosnia

Serbia Supplied Weapons to Croatian Serbs

International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY)

Milosevic Trial - The Hague - Court Room One

Day 139, 30 January 2003

THE HAGUE - Speaking slowly, protected witness C-013 made an important link between Belgrade and the war in Croatia. He told the Court that a police officer from the Serbian MUP (Ministry of the Interior) was in charge of transporting and distributing JNA weapons across the Danube to arm the local Serb territorial defense (TO) in Croatia in 1991. The weapons were stored in Dalj, where the TO would arrive to pick them up. He also implicated the head of Milosevic's Security Service in the campaign to take Vukovar.

Though his identity was protected, C-013 revealed that he was a member of the local Serbian police in the Vukovar area. As such, he was well placed to see the weapons transfer. He also testified to the involvement of Yugoslav Army (JNA) troops and paramilitaries in fighting in the region. While he said that the JNA intervened early to help the Croats withdraw from an action they initiated, he also testified that after coming to the area, the JNA established a headquarters near the Serbian TO and stayed. JNA cooperation with the TO included advice, as well as participation in attacks against villages, including Dalj and Erdut, by Serbian forces.

Zeljko Raznatovic (Arkan) also set up a headquarters in the area, arriving with 50 to 60 of his paramilitary "Tigers." C-013 testified they wore black uniforms and were well-armed and equipped, commensurate with the status of an elite unit. While there, the Tigers grew to 300 to 400 men, mostly arriving from Serbia. They engaged in looting and terrorizing the local population, as well as murder and extortion.

C-013 testified that the TO operated two detention facilities in the area -- one at Dalj and another at Borovo Selo, where civilians were detained. On at least two occasions, Arkan and some of his men arrived at the detention facilities and took people away. The bodies of eleven of them turned up later in the exhumation of bodies from a well. Two men were reportedly able to buy their safety with one or two million Deutschmarks.

C-013 knew about or participated in a number of meetings with members of the alleged Joint Criminal Enterprise, including Arkan, Jovica Stanisic and Goran Hadzic. While the content of these meetings was disclosed in private session, C-013 publicly related an incident where Stanisic arrived with an entourage, emerging from his vehicle shouting and behaving arrogantly. He demanded to see Hadzic, President of the Serbian National Council of the SAO Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem, and to know why they had not yet taken Vukovar. He ordered a meeting with Hadzic and all TO commanders. Jovica Stanisic as chief of Serbian State Security was allegedly Milosevic's right hand man. On cross examination, Milosevic enticingly disclosed that his own name was mentioned at some of these meetings.

The bulk of Milosevic's cross examination occurred in private session. Judge May cautioned him at the outset not to ask questions that might reveal the witness's identity as he has been wont to do. Apparently, the Judge erred on the side of caution, given the potential danger to witnesses. After an hour or more, Judge May interrupted Milosevic's questioning to point out that he was wasting both his and the Court's time by repetitively asking the witness things he'd said he knew nothing about. A frustrated Judge May commented, "It is the Accused's practice to put as much information as he claims he has to the witness." Turning to Milosevic he advised him to challenge the testimony the witness had given rather than trying to present his case. "All you've done is to put a lot of allegations of what you claim happened to Serbs," Judge May continued. "It is your usual practice but it is time to deal with the evidence the witness has given, concerned with what is in the indictment." Before cutting off a persistent Milosevic, the Presiding Judge acknowledged, "You have your own reasons for doing [this] -- to get publicity. As far as the Court is concerned, it is a pointless exercise."

In his final public cross examination, Milosevic managed to elicit more details which substantiated C-013's earlier testimony on weapons supply from Serbia. He should have stuck with his pointless exercise.

Submitted by Judith Armatta on 30 January, 2003 - Updated: 03 February 2003 14:31

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Early Warnings of Ethnic Cleansing

International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY)

Milosevic Trial - The Hague - Court Room One

Day 140, 31 January 2003

THE HAGUE - The Yugoslav tragedy has heroes as well as villains. You just don't hear about the heroes as much. Charles Kirudja, an international civil servant with the United Nations Protection Force

(UNPROFOR) who testified at the Milosevic trial on Friday, might well be one of them, for his early warnings of ethnic cleansing -- if only those with power had listened to him.

Mr. Kirudja was first posted to the area of Western Slavonia in Croatia to help implement the Vance Plan in April 1992. The Vance Plan, negotiated to stop the war in Croatia, provided for a cease fire, complete demobilization of all military forces, turnover of weapons to the UN, provision for local police forces to maintain law and order, and the voluntary return of displaced persons. Fairly quickly, Mr. Kirudja discovered that Serbs and Croats had two very different views of the Vance Plan. Where Croats considered that the Plan required UNPROFOR to deploy along the civil borders between the former republics, the Serbs understood the international force would deploy along the confrontation line, thus securing their victories in recent fighting. The disputed areas came to be known as "The Pink Zone."

Not long after his arrival, Mr. Kirudja also became aware that local Serb officials were operating on their own agenda, i.e. that all Serbs should live in one country, separated from non-Serbs. General Spiro Nikovic, Commander of the JNA 10th Corps, who Mr. Kirudja described as "a very impressive man . . . truly dedicated to his profession, trying to do a fair job . . . to demobilize," described his understanding of the new reality, a reconstituted Yugoslavia made up of seven countries. In it, eighty percent of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be under the control of the Serbs, who would also control 93% of what he called the Republic of Serbian Krajina. While the intention to control the Krajina illustrates the Serb view that the Vance Plan consolidated their war gains, the intention to control Bosnia-Hercegovina is an indication that the war had just begun. The truce in Croatia allowed Serbian forces to regroup for the Bosnia campaign.

As part of the demobilization, General Nikovic conscientiously informed Mr. Kirudja that the JNA had orders to withdraw all non-native born officers from the Krajina and Bosnia-Hercegovina, with the exception of 13 officers who would remain. In addition, he provided Mr. Kirudja with a list of troops and weapons that would be left behind "for the territorial defense (TO)." General Nikovic declared the JNA's intention was to leave a clear and clean situation in Croatia when the JNA pulled out. He was never able to see that realized. With two to three weeks left to complete demobilization, General Nikovic was retired. It was "unmistakably something he did not expect," according to Mr. Kirudja. It made way for the transformation of the local TO from a law enforcement organ into an army.

Local Serbs, according to Mr. Kirudja, found a major loophole in the Vance Plan for disarmament and demobilization of UN protected areas -- the requirement to form local police forces for civilian law enforcement purposes. They merely changed the military green camouflage to police blue and repainted their armed personnel carriers. They didn't bother to change the command structure or the names of its divisions. Eventually, after Croatia stormed the Maslinica Bridge, its only connection to Dalmatia, Serbian forces had the excuse they need to retake weapons they'd turned over to the UN. Their new armed force was called the Army of the Republic of Serbia Krajina.

How the Serb intention to control 80% of Bosnia-Hercegovina was to be realized also emerged in events on the ground. Mr. Kirudja began to notice disquieting signs in the area that became known as the Bihac Pocket. Serbs withdrew from the predominantly Muslim enclave and took up positions on the surrounding hills, from which they soon began shelling Bihac. On the 15th of May, the JNA blew up the airport. Mr. Kirudja wrote a report to his superiors in which he relayed his concern. "I fear that behind the mountains . . . unspeakable atrocities may be unfolding." His intention, he wrote, was to "alert the authorities with competence to address the problems of the desperate people in the area."

Problems were also coming from another direction. The mayor of Dvor, then Serb controlled, approached him with a strange request. The mayor and his counterpart in Bosanski Novi across the river had agreed to transport 5000 people through Bosanski Novi so they could relocate in Austria or Slovenia. The mayor wanted UNPROFOR to provide a film crew to record that the people were transiting safely. Mr. Kirudja replied that it seemed unnatural for so many people to leave their homes, and he asked who they were. When the mayor said they were all Muslims, Mr. Kirudja protested that the mayor didn't have the authority to transport people from another country, i.e. Bosnia-Hercegovina. To this, the mayor informed him there was a new government in central Bosnia where the people were moving from, which was now part of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was an entity Mr. Kirudja had never heard of before.

Mr. Kirudja rejected the request. He felt the UN was being asked to participate in creating thousands of refugees, a problem they usually assist in resolving. The local Serb officials were not dissuaded. The next day the mayor of Bosanski Novi showed up to reiterate the request and provide a more detailed explanation. Under Mr. Kirudja's probing, the mayor revealed the transferees were Muslim men who had refused to swear allegiance to the new government or to fight for it. Mr. Kirudja said it did not sound like they were leaving voluntarily. He recorded the mayor's reply in his diary and read it out in court at the request of prosecutor Dermot Groome: "I admit that the Muslims have been under pressure from armed Serbian military irregulars." The mayor didn't get a UN escort. Apparently, the mayors went ahead with their plans anyway.

One of the most dramatic moments in Mr. Kirudja's testimony came when he testified about receiving a flash report from the UN Military Observer post across the river from Bosanski Novi. The observer described seeing hundreds of people being herded into a football stadium, some being detained and others loaded onto buses. Mr. Groome asked the witness whether there was anything peculiar about the arrangement of people on the football field. Mr. Kirudja's response ended the day's testimony: "They had formed themselves into an 'SOS.'" Mr. Groome: "The universal sign for help?" Mr. Kirudja: "Yes."

In this way, the so-called cease fire in Croatia set the stage for the war in Bosnia. Mr. Kirudja continues his testimony Monday.

Submitted by Judith Armatta on 31 January, 2003 - Updated: 03 February 2003 14:41

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Being Neutral In a Non-Neutral Situation: The UN Problem in Bosnia

International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY)

Milosevic Trial - The Hague - Court Room One

Day 141, 03 February 2003

THE HAGUE - In his second day of direct testimony and under cross examination by Milosevic, Mr. Charles Kirudja revealed the major weakness of the United Nations in responding to the crisis in the former

Yugoslavia: its insistence on being neutral in a non-neutral situation, i.e. treating aggressors and victims as if they were equally guilty.

Mr. Kirudja, a former UN official in the Balkans, testified to the accuracy of reports he sent his superiors as early as May 1992 of Serbian forces ethnically cleansing parts of Bosnia. In one report, he relayed information from refugees about the existence of concentration camps in Keraterm, Prijedor, Trnopolje, Omarska and Manjaca, in which conditions were "atrocious," including regular beatings and deprivation of food and water. General Sadish Nambiar, force commander of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia, telephoned Mr. Kirudja to express his concern about the allegations. Very politely, he asked, "Charles, do you really believe there are concentration camps?" When Mr. Kirudja replied yes, it was what they were being told, the General suggested "maybe they were detention camps." Though the witness did not back down, the UN took no action at that time to investigate. Not long after, the images of skeletal men behind barbed wire hit television screens around the world, after a British TV crew gained access to one of the camps.

In a written response to his reports about Bosnian refugees streaming into his area (Sector North in Croatia), Mr. Kirudja's superiors told him not to get involved in what was going on in Bosnia. He characterized the response as "sad, though not unexpected." "We were not exceeding our concern. We were responding to people in need drawn to where we were by the fact of the UN flag flying [over our building]." Mr. Kirudja informed his staff that they would continue to respond. As well, he continued to make reports to his UN superiors. And the local Serb officials continued to ask for UN assistance to relocate thousands of Bosnian Muslims.

On cross examination, Milosevic read a recent statement attributed to General Nambiar to the effect that there was "no genocide beyond the killings and massacres on all sides that are typical of such conflict conditions." His representative on the ground, however, disagreed. "We did see violence from all three groups, but not of equal magnitude or weight in terms of numbers, repercussions, and impact," Mr. Kirudja said. Milosevic then showed a videotape of the General stating, "None of my troops ever gave me any reports of genocide . . . . There were allegations by other people, but my troops were not a witness to it and none reported it to me." In response, Mr. Kirudja pointed out that the General had very carefully limited his statement to his "forces," referring to military forces while Mr. Kirudja and his staff were civilian. The General's statement, he said, might be technically correct, but not factually.

Many analyses and criticisms have been written about the UN role in the wars of the former Yugoslavia, including by the UN itself. Today's courtroom drama is an apt illustration. Despite reports from their own observers in the field, UN officials continued to put the events into a context that fit their mission. Serb ethnic cleansing in Bosnia was not on the UN agenda in mid-1992. Their mission was to observe the demilitarization of forces in Croatia, while a political settlement was sought through another process. Reports of ethnic cleansing and concentration camps were inconvenient. They concerned Bosnia, an area beyond the immediate UN mission. Perhaps, if they didn't notice -- or if they called a concentration camp a detention facility -- it would go away. Yet, avoidance is rarely a viable strategy.

In defense of the UN, it is only as good as its members and structure permit -- and its members wanted the Balkans conflict contained more than they wanted a real resolution that might have required more involvement than they were prepared for. At a minimum, however, they should have found another name for their mission than UN Protection Force, since they were not designed to or capable of protecting anyone. A salve to some consciences was a deception to desperate people -- and that was indefensible.

While UN officials sought to ignore the growing crisis, local Serbian mayors sought UN help in carrying out their ethnic cleansing activities. Mr. Kirudja testified that he was shocked when one of them presented him with a computer list of 7700 plus names of Bosnian Muslims who they wanted UN assistance in relocating. "[The meticulous list of people to be relocated] was a reminder of WWII," he said. When he confronted local officials about how wrong this was, they responded with a lack of comprehension, as well as determination to carry out their plan.

One official, however, did not show such naiveté when Mr. Kirudja resisted UN involvement in the relocation of Bosnian Muslims out of Bosnia. According to Mr. Kirudja's contemporaneous notes, the man warned, "If the Serb side is not respected there could be massive deaths on both sides. If we are left to resolve the matter by ourselves, we will resolve it very quickly."

Mr. Kirudja and his staff were caught on the horns of a dilemma. On one side were their UN superiors who didn't want to hear about ethnic cleansing or concentration camps. On the other were local Serbian officials who tried to implicate and involve them in their ethnic cleansing operation. In the middle were the Bosnian Muslim refugees, homeless and desperate. To aid the refugees to find safety was also to aid the local Serb officials in their project of cleansing Bosnia of its Muslims. In such a situation, Mr. Kirudja chose to do the only humane thing -- to help the refugees, to confront the Serbs and to continue reporting the horrific situation to his superiors. If his conscience is clear, those of others should not be.

Submitted by Judith Armatta on 03 February, 2003 - Updated: 03 February 2003 14:53

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International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), Milosevic Trial - The Hague 11/11/2002 - Trial Of Slobodan Milosevic

C-036 To Testify Tomorrow

‘Labrador’ operation

The Hague - After a ten-day break, the Milosevic trial was continued today by testimony of Mustafa Candic. He said that in 1990 and 1991 JNA organized ‘Labrador’ and ‘Opera’ operations. They consisted of terrorist actions and spreading false information in Croatia. Candic said KOG in Zagreb ‘had a strong network of cooperates in Croatian state security service and among high officials of HDZ’. ‘Within ‘Labrador’ operation, they performed a terrorist action of mine planting of Jewish graves on Zagreb ‘Mirogoj’ cemetery. The goal was to present the then Croatian authorities as pro-fascist and create hostility of Jews towards it’, said Candic. The members of ‘Labrador’ had stocks of weapons and explosive at several locations in Zagreb. The planned attack on Zagreb synagogue was not conducted because the group was discovered and had to flee to Belgrade. Candic precised that KOG operations were directed by colonel Slobodan Rakocevic in Zemun, and by lieutenant-colonel Ivan Sabolovic and major Cedo Knezevic in Zagreb. Radenko Radojicic and Slavko Malobabic were among their accomplices.

Candic said that a propaganda war department was formed in KOG after ‘Labrador’ was over. Candic mentioned the allegedly tapped conversation of two HDZ officials, who called on Croatian population to come to Croatia from Serbia, as an example of the department’s false information. This conversation was broadcasted in TV Belgrade daily news, with a purpose of spreading the lies about reasons why Croats left Vojvodina. He said that shots of massacred bodies made by KOG officer Ivica Katancic were broadcasted on TV Belgrade as shots of Serbian casualties. Candic repeated claims that some generals signed statements of loyalty to Milosevic, for example general Bozidar Stevanovic, commander of Belgrade Air Force corps.

Former FRY president Slobodan Milosevic suggested during cross-examination of the prosecution witness Mustafa Candic, that JNA was not engaged in armament of Serbs outside Serbia in early nineties. Candic remained by his statement. Milosevic claimed that some officers armed Serbs ‘on friendly basis’ and on their own, not after orders from JNA. The witness dismissed that, explaining that the operation had a name and participants had to submit reports – those were the proofs that they did it all on somebody’s order. Candic confirmed KOG worked at that time on penetration into all spheres of civil life, police and state security in Croatia and Bosnia, but also in Serbia. The witness said his information was that Serbian leadership worked on disintegration of Yugoslavia. The witness said some statements from SANU memorandum about general danger for Serbs led to general objective of creation of Greater Serbia.

In the continuance of the trial all sides will discuss Milosevic’s health condition and proposals of the prosecution and amicii curiae about the further procedure. The prosecution presented protected witness C-036, but he did not testify because of minor technical problems. C-036 will start his testimony tomorrow with his image and voice electronically distorted. The judicial council allowed his attorney Peter Michael Muller to be present. The presence of attorney, which is not usual, was allowed because C-036 was a suspect himself. An indictment is expected to be issued against him soon.

‘C-036 was protected within witness protection program. Considering that he might be accused himself, he is entitled to have his attorney by him. According to pre-trial note of the prosecution, C-036 should testify about process of formation of Serbian Democratic Party in Kninska Krajina. Next, he should testify about creation of Serbian Autonomous Region (SAO) Krajina and, later, Republic Srpska Krajina in Croatia, from 1990 to early 1992, and Milosevic’s connection with that. The prosecution plans to introduce 75 documents into evidence through his testimony. C-036 is being called an insider who will help to connect political leaders of Croatian Serbs with the accused.

Milosevic was accused of ‘violent removal of majority of non-Serbian population from about one third of Croatian territory. The territory was planned to become a part of new Serb-dominated country’. The indictment lists participants in that ‘joint criminal act’: Borisav Jovic, Branko Kostic, Veljko Kadijevic, Blagoje Adzic, Milan Babic, Milan Martic, Goran Hadzic, Jovica Stanisic, Franko Simatovic, known as "Frenki", Tomislav Simovic, Vojislav Seselj, Momir Bulatovic, Aleksandar Vasiljevic, Radovan Stojicic "Badza" and Zeljko Raznatovic "Arkan". They are all suspects and under investigation of the Hague Tribunal prosecution, except Stojicic and Raznatovic, who are no longer alive. Martic surrendered himself last spring. He is accused of shelling of Zagreb in spring 1995.

According to pre-trial note of the prosecution, witness C-036 should confirm that Milosevic ‘directly participated in formation of the Serb local territorial defense in Croatia. C-036 is also among sources that should confirm creation of Serbian police training camps for paramilitaries and volunteers in SAO Krajina and SAO Slavonija, Baranja and Western Srem’. ‘Milan Martic, in cooperation with Simatovic, controlled all armed formations in the field. The territorial defense answered to Martic, not the president of SAO Krajina Mina Babic, said the document of the prosecution.

C-036 should confirm that Milosevic was in constant contact with highest JNA officers, with the control over army. ‘With the approval of the accused and his associates, radical Serbs refused all negotiations with Croatian government and resorted to violence. Moderate Serbs received treats, they were prosecuted or killed. The accused and Borisav Jovic showed clear inclination towards radical faction of Serbian Democratic Party during sessions in November 1990. They promised them the protection of JNA’, says the pre-trial note from the prosecution, referring to witness C-036. The witness should also speak about the meeting of Milosevic and RSK leaders, Milan Martic and Goran Hadzic in particular. It was then decided that Serbia should finance RSK defense until the end of the year. Prosecutor Geoffrey Nice announced earlier that the testimony of C-036 would take at least three days. The trial will continue tomorrow at 9.30 AM.

 Copyright © 2002-2004 by VoiceofCroatia.net. All rights reserved.
Revised: 11/11/07 01:36:33 -0600.